This study examines the effect of price on the decision by older workers and early retirees to take up health insurance for which they are eligible. The analysis is based on administrative data from a medium sized employer and takes advantage of a natural experiment created by the firm's health insurance contribution policy. For retirees, the amount the firm contributes toward coverage depends on when a person retired and her years of service at that date. As a result of this policy, there is considerable variation in out-of-pocket premiums faced by individuals in the data, but this variation is independent of the non-price attributes of the health insurance plans offered, and plausibly exogenous to worker characteristics that are likely to affect the demand for insurance. We find that price has a statistically significant, but small effect on the decision to take up coverage. The implied elasticities are very similar to results found in previous studies using very different data.
Introduction
There is considerable concern among US policy makers about the insurance coverage of "nearelderly" adults, i.e., those between the ages of 55 and 64. Because attachment to the labor force weakens as individuals approach the normal retirement age of 65, individuals in this age group have lower rates of employer-provided health insurance than younger adults (Monheit et al. 2001 ). Many older workers who lose their jobs are unable to find new jobs that provide health insurance, while others withdraw from the labor market altogether. Whereas many on tax credits for non-group coverage. While this approach is not specifically targeted at particular age groups, the impact of a tax credit policy is likely to be most pronounced on the near-elderly as they tend to have a stronger demand for insurance and are more likely to rely on the non-group market than younger consumers.
In order to evaluate these potential policies, it is necessary to understand the factors that Preliminary and Incomplete -Do N ot Cite 2 influence the demand for health insurance of older Americans. In particular, it is important to have good estimates of the price elasticity of health insurance take-up for this group. This parameter is essential for forecasting the impact of subsidies on the number of people who choose to take up health insurance. To estimate take-up elasticities it is necessary to have good data on the insurance options available to individuals and the prices charged for them.
Population surveys that provide information on insurance coverage lack this information.
Thus, most research on the elasticity of demand for health insurance uses data on employees who are offered insurance by their employer but are required to contribute toward that coverage.
In this paper we use data from an employer-sponsored health insurance program to estimate the effect of out-of-pocket premiums on the insurance take-up decisions of workers and early retirees between the ages of 55 and 64. Like many employers, this firm altered its retiree health benefits program in the mid-1990s in an attempt to control spending. This policy change created an excellent natural experiment for estimating the effect of price on employee and retiree health insurance decisions. Prior to the reform, the company subsidized the coverage of active employees and retirees at comparable levels. Under the current system, the amount the firm contributes towards the insurance coverage of retirees depends on when a person retired and how many years she had been with the company. Specifically, individuals who retired after January 1993 receive a reduced contribution (relative to active employees and pre-1993 retirees) and therefore face a higher out-of-pocket cost of coverage. For these post-1993 retirees, the employer contribution is positively related (and thus prices to retirees are negatively related) to years of employment at the firm. Thus, two otherwise similar individuals who either retired at different points in time (i.e., before or after January 1993) face very different prices. Likewise, prices will be quite different for individuals who retired at the same date, but with different years of service. This variation is ideal for identifying the effect of price on the demand for insurance since it is independent of any features of the plans offered (i.e., benefit generosity or the perceived quality of affiliated providers). Similarly, it
should not be correlated with individual characteristics that are likely to be related to the demand for insurance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes several previous studPreliminary and Incomplete -Do N ot Cite 3 ies that also estimate take-up elasticities using data on workers offered coverage by their employers. Section 3 describes our data, presents descriptive evidence on the relationship between price and the take-up decision, and lays out our econometric strategy. We present our regression results in Section 4 and concluding comments in the 5th and final section.
Previous Literature
Several recent studies use different types of data to examine the effect of price on the decision to take up private health insurance. The strengths and weaknesses of the analyses reflect the advantages and limitations of each data source. The main limitation of both of these studies is that the variation in price comes entirely from differences across employers. As a result, the results may be biased by unobserved heterogeneity. The direction of this bias is unclear. On one hand, imagine that firms set employee contributions as a fixed percentage of total premiums. In this case, plans that have a higher actuarial value, and are therefore more attractive, will be more expensive to employees. This will cause the price effect to be biased toward zero. On the other hand, it could be that firms that pay higher compensation in general offer better health benefits and subsidize them more fully than firms that pay less overall. In this case, better coverage will be positively correlated with lower prices, causing the partial effect of price to be overstated.
A potentially compounding factor is that not all small firms offer health benefits. This means They estimate a take-up elasticity of -0.02. (2003) analyze a real experiment conducted by a large employer as part of an effort to redesign its fringe benefit offerings. Employees participating in the experiment were asked to choose from a menu of hypothetical benefits, including health, dental and long term care insurance as well as a vision plan and wellness benefits. For each type of benefit there were several alternatives including the option of declining coverage.
Royalty and Hagens
The prices of the various options were manipulated in order to estimate the impact of price on employee choices. For all benefits, price is found to have a small negative impact on the decision to take up any coverage. This effect was statistically significant for all benefits but health insurance.
An important advantage of these two studies is that they exploit price variation that is independent of other attributes of the health insurance offered to employees and plausibly exogenous to characteristics of employees that affect the demand for insurance. However, each study has its own shortcomings. One weakness of the Gruber and Washington paper is that the key variable in their analysis is a function of the employee's marginal tax rate, which is not directly observed. Thus, they must impute marginal tax rates from other sources. The accuracy of this imputation and its impact on the results are not clear. The main limitation of Royalty and Hagens' analysis is that it is based on hypothetical, rather than actual, choices.
The data we use is similar to the data used by Gruber and Washington and Royalty and Hagens in that it comes from a single employer and relies on within-plan variation in price that is plausibly exogenous. As in the Gruber and Washington study, the variation is driven both by rules that generate cross-sectional price differences across different classes of individuals, as well as from changes in prices over time. The main advantage of our data relative to theirs is that the price variable is observed directly in the data and measured without error. The main advantage compared to the data used by Royalty and Hagens is that we analyze actual, rather than hypothetical, choices. A final feature that distinguishes our analysis from all the others is our focus on near-elderly workers and retirees. We turn now to a description of our data.
Data and Methods

Data Source and Sample Construction
The administrative data we use come from a medium-sized employer (roughly 2700 employees) located in the Southwestern US and pertain to the health insurance choices made by active employees and early retirees during period from 1998 to 2003. Because we are interested in estimating take-up elasticities that are relevant to Medicare buy-in proposals, we focus on individuals between the ages of 55 and 64. In order to minimize the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, we limit the analysis sample to people who retired after 1990. The main reason is that individuals who retired in the 1980s and are still under the age of 65 by the late 1990s must have retired at a very young age. Some people fitting this description may have retired very young because of serious health problems. Others may have taken early retirement only to start a second career elsewhere. In either case, there is reason to think that they are quite different than the average employee or retiree in this age group.
Because we use multiple years of data, individuals can contribute between one and six Preliminary and Incomplete -Do N ot Cite 6 observation to the sample Overall, we have a sample size of 2,225 observations on 632 individuals. The majority of these observations (1,626 or 73%) are on post-1993 retirees, for whom there is the richest price variation. There are 343 observations on active employees (15.4% of the sample) and 256 observations on pre-1993 retirees (11.5%).
Health Insurance Options and Prices
The firm offers the same health insurance options-two Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and one Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)-to active employees and retirees.
The out-of-pocket premiums charged for these plans differ depending on employment status and, for retirees, on the date of retirement and years of service at the time of retirement.
For active employees, the employer contribution is less than the full cost of each plan; employees are required to pay the difference between the employer contribution and the cost of their chosen plan. Among retirees, different rules apply depending on whether the individual retired before or after January 1993. In most years, individuals who retired before this date face the same out-of-pocket premiums as active employees and when this is not the case the differences between the two groups are very small.
2 For all plans, a higher contribution is required for two-party and family coverage.
For individuals who retired after January 1993, out-of-pocket premiums depend on the person's years of service at the time of retirement. Those who had worked for the company for at least 25 years face the same prices as the active employees and pre-1993 retirees.
Retiree contributions increase by a fixed percentage for each year of service less than 25. This variation is ideal for estimating take-up elasticities since there is no reason to believe that when a person began working for the company-which determines years of service at the point of retirement-is related to the demand for insurance. One might argue that the case for exogeneity of price differences between pre-and post-1993 retirees is weaker. In theory, the differential treatment of these two groups might have induced some workers with a strong demand for health insurance to retiree just before the cut-off date in order to benefit from the more generous subsidy. However, in reality this is not a concern as the employer's policy was determined retroactively. 3 One might also argue that, even controlling for age, there are a number of differences between active employees and early retirees, which would argue against using price differences between active employees and retirees to identify price effects. There are three responses to this argument. First, the fact that prices different between actives and some, but not all, retirees mitigates the potential problem. A second, related point, is that there is enough variation in our data to explicitly control for differences between active employees and different cohorts of retirees. Third, since we have enough data on post-1993 retirees, we can completely eliminate the problem by excluding active employees from the analysis altogether. As is typically the case with administrative data, there is relatively little information on individual characteristics. We observe each individual's age, gender, and marital status.
Summary Statistics
The mean age of the sample is just under 60 years. This mean is quite stable over the time period even as the number of individuals represented in the sample grew from 292 in 1998 to 459 in 2003. As might be expected, retirees are slightly older than active employees, though because of the way we drew the sample based on age, the difference is fairly small (60 vs.
58.5).
Roughly three-quarters of the sample is married and a similar proportion is male. As with age, there is no trend in either variable over time. Surviving spouses of deceased former employees are entitled to health insurance coverage through the firm. They represent 6% of our retiree sample.
We do not have data on income. As a proxy, we use ZIP code level data from the 2000 Population Census the median income for households headed by adults between the ages of 55 and 64. Information on each person's ZIP code is also used to identify people living in rural areas. We use this as a control variable to account for the possibility that other insurance options may be more limited in such areas.
Descriptive Evidence on the Effect of Price on Take-up
Panel A of Table 2 gives a partial sense of the price variation generated by the firm's contribution policy and by the fact that premiums were generally increasing over time. The figures show that in each year, the premium for the least costly plan was higher for the post-1993 retirees than the other groups. When we account for the additional opportunity cost of foregoing the payment for waiving coverage, the mean differences across the groups are less pronounced, though still statistically significant. Between 1998 and 2003, prices increased for all three groups.
Panel B of Table 2 reports take-up rates for these three groups for each year. The pattern in the data suggests a negative effect of price on take-up, albeit a modest one. In 1998, the take-up rate was highest for the pre-1993 retirees, who faced the lowest premiums, and In the full sample, 85.7% live within the service area of both HMOs, 1.6% live where one of the two HMOs is an option, and 12.7 live in areas where the PPO is the only option.
Econometric Specification
To fully account for this variation in price, and to control for other observed factors that are likely to affect the deand for insurance, we estimate a reduced form probit model in which the propensity to take up coverage is a function of the price of coverage (P ) and a vector of individual characteristics (X ):
(1)
The observed analog to T* is a binary variable, T, that equals one if a person takes up coverage through the firm and equals zero otherwise.
The control variables in X include several demographic characteristics: age, gender, marital status and whether the individual qualifies for health benefits by being a surviving spouse of a former employee. We interact gender and marital status to account for the possibility that gender differences in take-up behavior may be different for married and single individuals. Since married and single individuals have very different outside options for health insurance, their demand for coverage is likely to be quite different. Therefore, in addition to estimating the model on a pooled sample with marital status as an independent variable, we also estimate models on separate married and single subsamples.
Given the nature of our price variation, it is essential to control for differences between active employees and retirees and, among retirees, for differences in retirement date. We do this by including a set of dummy variables for individuals retiring in the following periods: 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999- Table 3 presents the probit results from our preferred specification. The first column is for the full sample; in the next two, the sample is stratified by marital status. Since probit coefficients are not directly meaningful, we report marginal effects (i.e., probability derivatives) evaluated at the mean of the particular estimation sample. The standard errors for these effects are in parentheses. 6 For the price coefficient, we also report an estimate of the elasticity evaluated at the estimation sample mean.
Main Results
Before turning to the estimated price effects, we will briefly summarize the coefficients on the control variables. In the full sample we find that married men are more likely to take up coverage than married women, but among single workers the gender difference goes the other way. This is consistent with previous research on take-up (not controlling for price) using nationally representative data (Buchmueller 1996 (Buchmueller /1997 ) and with the results of Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin (2001). Individuals who qualify for health benefits because they are the surviving spouse of a former employee are less likely to take up coverage, perhaps because they have a weaker attachment to the firm. One difference with previous studies in this area is that we find a positive and significant effect of age. This effect is fairly strong, implying that the take-up rate for the oldest individuals in our sample (64 year olds) is 14 to 15 percentage higher than the youngest (55 year olds).
All else equal, take-up is higher for individuals living in a rural area and lower for in- The results for all three estimation samples imply that higher premiums reduce takeup. In the full sample, the marginal effect is -0.0008, which implies that $10 increase in price reduces take up by 0.8 percentage points. The estimated price effect for the married subsample is similar, which is not surprising given that over three-quarters of the sample is married. Like Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin, we find a weaker price effect for single individuals. For that subsample, the marginal effect of price (-0.0004) is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.14). This difference is likely explained by the fact that married workers are more likely to have other insurance options, most importantly the option of obtaining coverage through their spouse's employer or former employer. Single individuals, in contrast, have fewer substitutes and thus have a less elastic demand.
Evaluated at the sample means, these price effects imply take-up elasticities ranging from -0.08 (singles) to -0.15 (married individuals and the full sample). These elasticities are larger in magnitude than those estimated in prior studies. However, such comparisons must be made with caution as the average prices in our data are higher than in those studies. For example, in the data used by both Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin and Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin, the mean employee contribution is about $20. 7 The mean price for our full sample is $126. When we calculate the elasticity at a price of $23, which is Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin's mean expressed in 2002 dollars, and leave all other variables at the sample mean, we obtain an estimate of -0.025, which is very similar to the elasticity estimates of those prior studies.
Sensitivity Tests
To test the robustness of these results, we estimated a set of models using alternative specifications and sample definitions. The main results of these sensitivity tests are summarized in Table 4 . For ease of comparison, Row 1 re-caps the results for the price variable from Table 3 .
7 Comparisons with the other papers are less straightforward. The main independent variable in Gruber and Washington's study is the employee's share of premiums. Royalty and Hagens do not provide enough information to compare the mean prices in their data to ours.
Preliminary and Incomplete -Do N ot Cite 13 First, we consider the impact of using alternative price variables. Row 2 reports the price effects from a model using the sum of the average price facing an individual and the amount he or she would have received for waiving coverage. The marginal price effects from this specification are very similar to the results using the minimum price facing each person. In the full sample, the probability derivative with respect to price is -0.0013. The effects for the two subsamples are also slightly larger than in the baseline model and for single individuals the price effect is now statistically significant at the .10 level. The similarity between these two specifications not surprising because the variation in both variables is driven mainly by the employer's contribution, which has the effect of lowering or raising the entire schedule of prices according to a person's retirements status and years of service.
In the next two rows, we alter the sample inclusion criteria to make the estimation samples more homogeneous. As noted, one potential criticism of our baseline model is that part of price variation comes from differences between active employees and retirees and between individuals who retired before and after January 1993. While we explicitly control for the main effect of retirement status and retirement cohort, it is possible that this does not fully account for behavioral differences among these three groups. Therefore, in Row 3 we exclude individuals who retired before 1993. We restrict the sample even further in Row 4 by including only post-1993 retirees. In both of these cases, we use the same price variable as in Table 4 .
The results are robust to these changes in the sample definition. For all three estimation samples the probit coefficients, and hence the marginal effects, are essentially identical to the baseline. This is actually not surprising, given that post-1993 retirees represent 73% of the full sample and these retirees provide the most price variation. Because the means of the price variable changes when we restrict the sample in these ways, the elasticities are not identical to the baseline, though they are not that different.
Discussion
Estimates of the price elasticity of health insurance take-up are necessary for predicting how consumers will respond to policies that subsidize the purchase of health insurance and Preliminary and Incomplete -Do N ot Cite 14 for making comparisons among such policies that differ in the extent of the subsidy. The best evidence on take-up elasticities comes from studies that use data on employees who are offered health insurance by their employer and are required to make premium contributions toward that coverage.
In this study, we address this question using unique data from an employer-sponsored health benefit program. Because the employer's policy on funding coverage for retirees essentially generates random prices, our analysis is not subject to the problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity that are a potential concern in other studies. However, an obvious shortcoming of our data is the fact that they come from a single employer, which raises concerns about generalizability. Despite these differences with prior studies, our results are quite similar to their findings. We find that the out-of-pocket price of insurance has a statistically significant, though economically small, impact on the decision by employees and early retirees to accept coverage offered by the employer. The implied elasticities range from -0.02 to -0.19, depending on the price at which the function is evaluated.
These results have implications for proposals that would allow near-elderly individuals to buy into the Medicare program. A number of such proposals have been made in recent years. One element that varies considerably across proposals is the extent to which this coverage would be subsidized. While a full simulation of such policies is beyond the scope of this paper, our results and the results of other studies in the literature suggest that the degree of subsidy will not have a major impact on the number of people who gain coverage. 
